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Article 
PATENTING FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER: 
EXPLORING THE PATENTABILITY OF 
ARTIFICIAL ORGAN SYSTEMS AND 
METHODOLOGIES 
Jordana R. Goodman* 
The conception of Frankenstein’s monster bridges the ever-narrowing 
divide between man and machine. Long before Congress codified Section 
33(a) of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), Mary Shelley’s vague 
description of the monster’s creation has left people wondering: what 
defines a human organism? Through an analysis of patent law and 
scientific progress in the development of artificial organ systems, this paper 
explores the boundaries of patentable subject matter in the United States 
and attempts to clarify Congress’s determination that “no patent may issue 
on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Though patent 
law should incentivize development of artificial human tissues and organs, 
Section 33(a) of the AIA stands to limit scientific progress. Either judicial 
or legislative action must clarify the term “human organism” to balance the 
need for artificial organ development, while hindering unethical scientific 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every Frankenstein movie, book, comic strip, and television show 
demonstrates that, in biotechnology, “just because something can be done 
does not mean that it should be done.”1 Scientific progress in the fields of 
tissue engineering and organ transplantation have far surpassed Mary 
Shelley’s crude description of stitching body parts together to form a 
human being.2 Yet, patent law regarding artificial human engineering 
remains as unclear as Frankenstein’s definition of “Alive.”3 To truly 
promote the science of tissue engineering while avoiding incentivizing 
human experimentation, laws regarding the patentability of “human 
organisms” must be clarified. 
Patentable subject matter should “include anything under the sun that 
is made by man.”4 However, the discovery of something that pre-exists in 
nature, whether it is an element, law, or principle, cannot be the subject of a 
patent without further application.5 These discoveries “are manifestations 
of [the] laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”6 
 
 1 157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 2 See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 32 
(Wisehouse Classics 2015) (1831) (“The dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of 
my materials; and often did my human nature turn with loathing from my occupation, whilst, still urged 
on by an eagerness which perpetually increased, I brought my work near to a conclusion.”). 
 3 See generally FRANKENSTEIN (Universal Pictures 1931). 
 4 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); 
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923 at 6 (1952)). 
 5 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110 (2013) 
(“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” 
(citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948))). 
 6 Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130. 
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Patents relying on subject matter concerning a law of nature can only 
be patentable if the claim as a whole amounts to “significantly more” than 
the law of nature itself.7 For example, the creation of an artificial equivalent 
of an existing, natural product is not a patentable invention.8 Because the 
law of nature and embodiments of that law have existed before the artificial 
equivalent, the natural embodiment is “prior art,” thus barring the artificial 
creation from patent-eligibility.9 However, if a device or material that is 
created through the use of scientific or mathematical principles is useful 
and novel, with substantial differences from what exists in nature, the 
device or material could be patentable.10 
This line between patentable subject matter and laws or phenomena of 
nature may seem clear, but it has become far too blurry in the world of 
biotechnology. With the progress of CRISPR-Cas911, in vitro fertilization12, 
and artificial organ creation13, the ability to imitate nature in a laboratory 
has become less science fiction and more realistic possibility. 
Not only can scientists clone animals14, but scientists can now grow 
artificial tissues15, print organs16 and bones17, and even transplant artificial 
 
 7 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (“Instead, the claims at issue 
amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement using some unspecified, generic computer.” (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012))); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) 
(requiring “a practical result and benefit not previously attained” (quoting Househill Co. v. Neilson, 
Webster’s Pat. Cases 673, 683 (1842) (House of Lords)). 
 8 See In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (calling a clone 
unpatentable because it is a “time-delayed version[] of [a] donor mammal[]” and already exists in 
nature); see also Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884); General Electric 
Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928); Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products 
of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 293, 323–34. 
 9 See Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2109 (determining that isolated and purified DNA was 
not made “with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature” (citing Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. at 310)); In re Roslin Inst., 750 F.3d at 1339. Prior art is evidence that the claimed invention in the 
patent application has already existed. 
 10 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“[A] process is not unpatentable simply because it 
contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.”). 
 11 See generally Eric S. Lander, The Heroes of CRISPR, 164 CELL 18, 18-22 (2016) (giving a 
narrative perspective of the gene-editing invention, CRISPR); CRISPR Timeline, BROAD INSTITUTE, 
https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/crispr-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/R4ST-KYJ7] (providing a timeline of CRISPR-Cas9 progress). 
 12 See Bradley J. Van Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED. 379 (Jan. 25, 2007); 
Timeline: The History of In Vitro Fertilization, PBS: WGBH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh
/americanexperience/features/timeline/babies/ [https://perma.cc/GYG9-W5UY] (providing a timeline 
history of in vitro fertilization). 
 13 See Aleem Ahmed Khan, Emerging Technologies for Development of Humanized Bio-artificial 
Organs, 6 J. MED. ALLIED SCI. 1 (Jan. 31, 2016) (providing an overview of new techniques to create 
artificial organs). 
 14 See, e.g., X Cindy Tian et al., Cloning Animals by Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer – Biological 
Factors, 1 REPROD. BIOL. & ENDOCRINOL. 98 (Nov. 13, 2003) (discussing cloning of mammals); see 
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tissue into animals.18 In years to come, scientists may progress from 
creating artificial tissues to artificial organs to artificial organ systems.19 
These imitations of organs and organ systems are valuable for medical 
experimentation, pharmaceutical experimentation, and organ 
transplantation.20 When artificial organs are transplanted into natural 
humans, the line between man and patentable subject matter will become 
more blurred than ever before. The creation of Frankenstein’s monster, an 
artificial man, is coming closer every day. 
However, the law is at an impasse. Though in recent years, the 
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and Congress have all endeavored to 
codify and clarify patent law, their combined actions often leave scientists 
and lawyers with more questions than answers.21 Through an exploration of 
the American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101, and Section 33(a), this paper 
shows where the progress of science is promoted and where it is hindered 
 
also I. Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE 
810 (Feb. 27, 1997) (publishing the results of cloning a sheep). 
 15 See, e.g., Sean V. Murphy & Anthony Atala, 3D Bioprinting of Tissues and Organs, 32 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 773 (Aug. 2014) (presenting current and future predictions in the field of tissue and 
organ engineering). 
 16 See id. 
 17 See Leon S. Dimas et al., Tough Composites Inspired by Mineralized Natural Materials: 
Computation, 3D Printing, and Testing, 23 ADVANCED FUNCTIONAL MATERIALS 4269 (2013), 
(discussing producing a synthetic material with fracture behavior similar to bone). 
 18 See e.g., Jeremy J. Song et al., Regeneration and Experimental Orthotopic Transplantation of a 
Bioengineered Kidney, 19 NATURE MEDICINE 646 (May 2013) (discussing producing and transplanting 
a lab-grown kidney into a rat). 
 19 As of the publication of this paper, scientists have not developed artificial organ systems capable 
of human transplantation. However, the field of artificial organ development is progressing in that 
direction. See, e.g., Vivien Marx, Tissue Engineering: Organs from the Lab, 522 NATURE 373 (June 18, 
2015) (discussing the progress of organ engineering through scaffolds and microchips). 
 20 See LEONID GRININ & ANTON GRININ, THE CYBERNETIC REVOLUTION AND FORTHCOMING 
EPOCH OF SELF-REGULATING SYSTEMS 56 (Uchitel Publishing House 2016); see also Tyler Irving, 
‘Person-on-a-chip’ – U of T Engineers Create Lab-grown Heart and Liver Tissue for Drug Testing and 
More, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO ENGINEERING (Mar. 7, 2016), http://news.engineering.utoronto.ca
/person-on-a-chip-u-of-t-engineers-create-lab-grown-heart-and-liver-tissue-for-drug-testing-and-more/ 
[https://perma.cc/QZR4-LDT3] (showing that lab-grown heart and liver tissues can be used for drug 
testing and may have future applications in repairing and replacing damaged organs). 
 21 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (“Nor 
do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides has 
been altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we express no 
opinion about the application of § 101 to such endeavors.”); see also Erin Coe, The Battle for Patent 
Law: Federal Circuit Looks to Hold the Line as Supreme Court Eyes IP, LAW360 (July 9, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/814461/the-battle-for-patent-law [https://perma.cc/LC7C-7PT4] (“Is a 
patent obvious or not? Can [an infringing product] be enjoined or not? Is a patent eligible or not? The 
Supreme Court has sown extensive confusion in the law, partly by being unclear and particularly by 
being eager to knock down Federal Circuit-created standards as unduly rigid.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel)). 
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under current patent law.22 The vague determination that claims directed to 
human organisms are not patentable only hinders the progress of artificial 
organ development.23 Either judicial or legislative action must clarify the 
term “human organism” to balance the need for artificial organ 
development, while hindering unethical scientific development of artificial 
humans. 
Section II of this paper discusses the rights of patent owners and how, 
though patents convey no positive rights, patents do provide incentives to 
research in a particular scientific field. Section III of this paper discusses 
the evolution of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and in the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, both in the Supreme Court and under 
federal law. Section IV of this paper discusses what is considered “settled” 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as 
patentable and unpatentable subject matter. Section V analyzes the current 
unsettled patent law of biotechnology, specifically showing that both 
scientists and policy makers are striving to incentivize scientific 
progression while hindering unethical experimentation with artificial 
human creation. Section VI proposes a definition of human organism under 
patent law to incentivize creating artificial organs for donation without 
simultaneously incentivizing creating artificial humans. 
I. WHAT IS A PATENT: THE RIGHTS OF PATENT OWNERS 
To understand the implications of determining patentable subject 
matter, the definition of a patent and the rights it conveys to its assignee or 
owner must be explored. The negative right of exclusion can prevent others 
from making, using, selling, or offering to sell a patent. Though patents do 
not grant the right to make or use the claimed subject matter, the incentives 
of patent ownership discussed herein can be sufficient for scientists to 
research artificial creation of human tissues. 
A patent is a “special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of 
promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”24 It runs contrary to 
the general rule discouraging monopolies, allowing the patent owner(s) 
 
 22 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in various sections of 35 U.S.C.); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 23 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 33(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.” The law provides no 
definition of the term “human organism.”). 
 24 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (referencing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
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“the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention throughout the United States.”25 
A patent conveys no positive rights.26 A patent owner has no right to 
make, use, sell, or offer to sell his or her invention.27 This must be 
understood: an inventor who patents an invention may not be able to use 
his or her invention.28 The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) is not granting the patent owner the right to positively use the 
claimed invention in commerce.29 A person can pay for the best patent on 
his or her invention and no amount of money will allow them to use the 
invention they patented.30 A patentee must be cautious before proceeding to 
use his or her invention; parts of the person’s invention, the process of 
making parts of the person’s invention, or using that person’s invention in a 
particular way might be patented by someone else.31 
A patent conveys “a negative right of exclusion.”32 A patent allows the 
owner to prevent others from making, using, offering to sell, or selling a 
patented invention throughout the duration of the patent term.33 This means 
 
 25 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013) (patent owners may also exclude others from “importing the invention 
into the United States, and, if the invention is a process . . . exclude others from using, offering for sale 
or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that 
process.”). 
 26 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 4-5 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A] patent 
gives an inventor the right to exclude. A patent does not give the inventor the positive right to make, 
use, or sell the invention.” The text further quotes Judge Rich’s comparison of patents to property rights 
in real property. It explains that real property conveys “a right to use that carries with it a logically 
subordinate right to exclude. That right to exclude exists to ensure the owner’s full enjoyment of the 
right to use.” This right to use is a positive right, whereas a right to exclude others from using is a 
negative right.). 
 27 Id. 
 28 If a patent only conveys a negative right to exclude, it is possible that using the patented 
invention may infringe on the negative right to exclude conveyed previously to another inventor. 
 29 See Patent Process Overview, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov
/patents-getting-started/patent-process-overview#step1 [https://perma.cc/2E96-38U7] (providing a 
beginner’s guide to the patent process, including how the USPTO grants and rejects patent 
applications). 
 30 The United States does not have compulsory licensing in all areas of patents. Compulsory 
licensing would either allow someone to produce a product or process without the patent owner’s 
permission or create a set price for a patent owner to license the product. 
 31 If somebody else also possesses a negative right to exclude, that person can prevent a subsequent 
patent owner’s ability to produce or use the invention in the subsequent patent. 
 32 See, e.g., Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 243 F. 883, 890 (7th Cir. 1917) 
(explaining that a patent license is only an immunity from suit by the licensor and is not granting the 
“right to make, use, and sell” the entirety of the invention). 
 33 See, e.g., Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428 n.6 (D. Del. 2014) (“The 
core exclusionary right of a patent is the negative right of a ‘patentee’ to ‘exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention 
into the United States.’” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013))); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010). 
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that, when the USPTO grants a patent, the owner can exclude others from 
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention claimed in the 
patent. Essentially, in exchange for publicly teaching a person of ordinary 
skill in the art how to make and use the invention, the patent owner may 
prevent everyone else from using the patented claims for the life, or term, 
of the patent.34 Currently, a patent term is 20 years from the time of filing 
the patent application.35 
Ownership of a patent is different than the freedom to operate – the 
freedom to use the patent claim.36 A patent can be used to prevent other 
companies from operating because patents convey those negative rights. 
Someone who owns a patent can make anyone who wants to make or use a 
claim in a patent license that patent from the owner.37 However, a patent 
owner may not be able to make and use the contents of their own patent. 
That freedom to operate is determined by other patent owners: owners of 
patents that may overlap with the patent at issue.38 
A person can obtain a patent for any “new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement.”39 This improvement can, and often does, include 
improvements on currently patented inventions. For example, Person A 
patented a table, claiming (1) a horizontal table top and (2) four table legs. 
Assume for the sake of argument that Person A invented the table: no table 
had ever existed before and, therefore, the invention and patent on the 
invention is completely new.40 During the term of Person A’s patent, no one 
can make or use the table claimed in Person A’s patent. However, during 
this term, Person B invented and patented a table claiming (1) a horizontal 
table top (2) four table legs, and (3) a hole in the horizontal table top (for an 
umbrella). Person B could obtain a patent on this new invention because 
the hole in the horizontal table top is a new and useful improvement. 
 
 34 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013). 
 35 See id. (“[S]uch grant [of a patent] shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent 
issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United 
States . . . .”). 
 36 See, e.g., Dov Greenbaum, New Rules, Different Risk: The Changing Freedom to Operate 
Analysis for Biotechnology, 11 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 139 (2010) (analyzing freedom to operate 
agreements in biotechnology). 
 37 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013). 
 38 See What Does “Freedom to Operate” Mean?, PATENT LENS, www.bios.net/daily/pententlens
/2768.html [https://perma.cc/NK6K-2HNQ] (providing a beginner’s guide to freedom to operate 
agreements and explaining that a freedom to operate agreement determines “whether a particular action, 
such as testing or commercializing a product, can be done without infringing valid intellectual property 
rights of others.”). 
 39 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 40 See Section III for further discussion about novelty in patent law. 
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However, Person B would not be free to make and use a table with four 
legs and a hole in the center of the table top because it would infringe on 
Person A’s patent. Person B would have to license Person A’s patent or 
wait until Person A’s patent expired to make and use her patented 
invention. Person B could also try to “design around” Person A’s patent by 
making a table that did not have every element of Person A’s patent claim. 
For example, if Person B made a table with three legs instead of four, 
Person B would not be subject to pay licensing fees to Person A to make 
and use the three-legged table. 
When evaluating a patent in the biotechnology space, there is a 
“distinction between a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which 
are tangible items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a series of 
acts or steps.”41 Product claims “cover what a device is, not what a device 
does.”42 Contrastingly, a process “consists of acts or steps, rather than 
tangible things. A process, therefore, has to be carried out or performed.”43 
Typically, a claim to a product is more valuable than a claim to a process 
because, when determining if a person infringed the patent, product 
infringement is easier to prove than process infringement.44 “To infringe a 
method claim, a person must have practiced all steps of the claimed 
method.”45 Additionally, “the sale of an apparatus capable of performing 
the patented method is not a sale of the method. A method claim is directly 
infringed only by the entity usurping the patented method.”46 
As discussed in further detail below in Section IV, patent incentives in 
the field of organ transplant and artificial tissue development are limited.47 
Currently, patent owners cannot sue doctors for practicing patented medical 
 
 41 See In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (highlighting the difference between 
product and process claims). 
 42 Peter Strand, What’s the Use? Understanding Method vs. Apparatus Use Infringement, 
LEXOLOGY (Jun. 28, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=df5ab67a-9322-44bd-bf2a-
db71cbb77169 [https://perma.cc/V4LT-Z8M7] (quoting Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1332). 
 43 See id. 
 44 See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Method claims are 
only infringed when the claimed process is performed, not by the sale of an apparatus that is capable of 
infringing use.”); see also Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 
561 (Summer 2006) (discussing offshore processes and obviousness of a process as barriers to prove 
both validity of patents and infringement of those patents). 
 45 See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Joy Techs., Inc. 
v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that a method claim is infringed when 
someone practices the patented method); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010). 
 46 Strand, supra note 42. 
 47 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2011) (limiting remedies available to patent owners of surgical 
procedure patents by exempting medical practitioners and health care entities from infringement 
liability); for further detail, see Section IV(B). 
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methods.48 Furthermore, though many patents have been sought and 
granted for methods to grow artificial tissues, a product patent for an 
artificial tissue would be considered far more valuable.49 To collect 
damages for directly infringing a method patent, the petitioner must prove 
that all steps of the patented method were performed by a third party, or 
substantially performed under a doctrine of equivalents test.50 Producing the 
product, such as an artificial tissue, would not necessarily be sufficient 
proof to collect damages from a process patent. However, if the patent were 
directed to that artificial tissue and not the method of creation, proving 
infringement would be far easier. 
II. AN EVOLUTION OF 35 U.S.C. § 101: WHAT ARE SECTIONS 101 AND 
33(A)? 
The object of this section is to discuss the present state of patent law 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Section 33(a). This delves into a brief history of 
the America Invents Act and codifying the policy that human organisms are 
not patentable. Furthermore, this section demonstrates the power of the 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit to interpret patentable subject matter. 
The section concludes by showing the difference between patentability of 
method and product claims of biotechnological developments. 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof,” is entitled to a patent, subject to the additional requirements of 
Title 35 of the United States Code.51 35 U.S.C. § 101 outlines the 
requirements related to patentable subject matter. 
Categorizing patentable subject matter has been a hotly contested 
issue, with four Supreme Court cases and a legislative overhaul of the 
patent system in the past decade alone.52 Patentable subject matter must 
 
 48 See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011). 
 49 See, e.g., Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), aff’d, 667 F.2d 
1232 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that generally, all steps of a method patent must be performed to 
infringe. However, if one step is omitted, infringement could be found under the doctrine of 
equivalents); PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., 525 F.3d 1159, 1167–68 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Under the all-elements rule, ‘an accused product or process is not infringing unless it contains each 
limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.’” (citing Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. 
Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). To prove infringement of a process patent, the 
plaintiff must show that a separate entity performed all steps of a patented process. Contrastingly, to 
prove infringement of a product patent, the plaintiff only needs to show that every element of a claim 
exists in a product created by or sold by the defendant. 
 50 See id. 
 51 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 52 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
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satisfy two conditions under 35 U.S.C. § 101: (1) the claimed invention 
“must be directed to one of the four statutory categories, and (2) must not 
be wholly directed to subject matter encompassing a judicially recognized 
exception.”53 Essentially, any process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter that is not a law of nature, natural phenomena, or 
abstract idea has the potential to be patentable.54 Indeed, as recently as 
2012, the Court explained that statutory subject matter included “anything 
under the sun that is made by man.”55 
The Court’s emphasis that subject matter must be made by man to 
qualify as patentable has been examined by the courts as far back as 1852 
in Le Roy v. Tatham.56 Judicial exceptions, namely laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas, are not patentable subject matter, even if 
discovered by man.57 Courts have determined that these exceptions do not 
fulfill a statutory category of patentable subject matter.58 Because laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not a process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, they are not patentable. 
This is not to say that living creatures are not patentable under United 
States law. Patents have issued to such subject matter as bacteria59, 
genetically engineered animals60, cloning techniques61, and in vitro 
fertilization techniques.62 The line between patentable subject matter and a 
“law of nature” is blurred in the biotechnology space. This line is 
 
Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 53 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (2015). 
 54 See id.; see also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354. 
 55 Mayo Collaborative Services, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 56 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; 
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right.”); see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) 
(“[m]anifestations of laws of nature” are “part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”). 
 57 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“a new mineral discovered in the earth 
or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.”). 
 58 See id.; see also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (“‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable’” (citing Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013))). 
 59 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,465,755 (issued Jun. 18, 2013) (patenting recombinant Salmonella 
bacterium). 
 60 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,113,616 (issued Aug. 25, 2015) (patenting a genetically modified 
mouse). 
 61 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,700,037 (issued Mar. 2, 2004) (patenting a method of preparing a 
cloned porcine embryo). 
 62 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,589,402 (issued May 20, 1986) (patenting a method of in vitro 
fertilization). 
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continuously clarified and altered both by legislative action and judicial 
interpretation. 
A. Where the Law Stands Judicially: What is Patentable? 
In recent years, both legislative action and judicial interpretation have 
imposed additional subject matter limitations through an interpretation of 
the four categories in 35 U.S.C § 101. Recently, transitory forms of signal 
transmission, contractual agreements between parties, data per se, and, 
most notably, a human per se are all outside the four statutory categories of 
35 U.S.C. § 101.63 To explore the future of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as applied to 
biotechnology and artificial tissue, the cases of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
Mayo Collab. Services v. Prometheus Labs., and Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics must be discussed.64 These cases collectively 
show that not only is the Supreme Court capable of judicially interpreting 
the four categories of subject matter, but the Court has actively and recently 
added to judicial exceptions of both method and product patents. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty expressly rejected the argument that “micro-
organisms cannot qualify as patentable subject matter until Congress 
expressly authorizes such protection.”65 The Chakrabarty Court held that 
Ananda Chakrabarty’s human-made genetically modified bacterium was 
patentable because it had a “property which is possessed by no naturally 
occurring bacteria.”66 Discussing patentable subject matter under § 101, the 
Court explained that “discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”67 In other words, discoveries 
are not patentable under § 101. The Court reviewed the three basic judicial 
exceptions to patentable subject matter under § 101, namely, “laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”68 The micro-organism in 
question, however, “plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter” because 
this is a “non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a 
product of human ingenuity.”69 Essentially, Chakrabarty established that 
 
 63 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (2015); see also Digitech Image Tech., 
LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (data per se); In re 
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cert. denied) (a contractual agreement); In re Nuijten, 
500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory forms of signal transmission); Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011) (a human per se). 
 64 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303 (1980). 
 65 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S at 314. 
 66 Id. at 303. 
 67 See id. at 309 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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living matter is patent eligible if it is manmade.70 Not only are some micro-
organisms patentable under United States law, but also the Court can 
determine whether a micro-organism qualifies as patentable subject matter 
without Congressional authorization.71 
The Mayo v. Prometheus decision controversially limited 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 subject matter in method claims, explaining that the process for 
personalized medicine dosing was not eligible for patent protection because 
the claims “effectively claim natural law or natural phenomena.”72 The 
patent claims relied on “the relationships between concentrations of certain 
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a . . . drug dosage will 
prove ineffective or cause harm.”73 The Court found that the steps of 
administering drugs, measuring a patient’s metabolite levels, and other 
additional steps in the claimed processes were not “sufficient to transform 
the nature of the claims” and render them patentable subject matter.74 After 
this case explicitly limited 35 U.S.C. § 101 by requiring method claims to 
have elements beyond routine and convention to be considered patentable 
subject matter, many looked to Congress to resolve technical amendments 
through the America Invents Act (“AIA”) and to reverse this limitation.75 
As explained below, the AIA did not overturn this ruling and, thus, the 
limitation remained. 
Though Chakrabarty showed that micro-organisms made by man can 
be patented under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the ruling in Association of Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics limited the decision.76 Myriad Genetics 
determined the validity of gene patents under United States law, 
 
 70 See id. at 310 (“Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His 
discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under 
§ 101.”). 
 71 See id. at 314 (“It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of 
patentability; but it is equally true that once Congress has spoken it is ‘the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.’” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803))). 
The Court explained that after Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Court can construe the language of 
Congress and can use legislative history and statutory purpose to interpret ambiguities in the law. 
 72 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012). 
 73 Id. at 1291. 
 74 Id. (further claiming that the doctor’s step of measuring a patient’s metabolite levels “is not 
normally sufficient to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such 
a law” (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978))). 
 75 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012), www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus
/id=22920/; Dennis Crouch, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v. 
Prometheus, PATENTLYO (Mar. 26, 2012), patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/punishing-prometheus-the-
supreme-courts-blunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html. 
 76 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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specifically looking at isolated DNA sequences.77 These DNA sequences 
were used for diagnostic breast cancer examinations.78 The Court held, 
much like in Mayo v. Prometheus, that the human intervention necessary to 
produce the isolated DNA sequences did not, in itself, render the subject 
matter patentable.79 Justice Thomas explained that Myriad’s claims were 
not “saved by the fact that isolating DNA from the human genome severs 
chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule.”80 
The Court simultaneously held that synthetically created gene sequences 
that do not exist in nature are patent eligible.81 
Frustratingly, the Myriad decision left a wide gray area between 
synthetic and natural creation. The Supreme Court justices did not 
“consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally 
occurring nucleotides” was altered in the DNA.82 Though the Court 
determined that naturally occurring, isolated DNA was not patentable and 
completely synthetic creations were patentable, the gray area of editing 
DNA and, more broadly, changing natural materials, was not explained. 
Moreover, the Court did not discuss imitation of naturally occurring 
substances through synthetic means, including the field of tissue 
engineering.83 
 
 77 See Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2111 (“we hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment 
is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is 
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”). 
 78 See id. at 2111 (“This case involves patents filed by Myriad after it made one such medical 
breakthrough. Myriad discovered the precise location and sequence of what are now known as the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.”). 
 79 See id. at 2110. 
 80 Id. The ruling in Myriad Genetics seemed to conflate two separate requirements for patent 
eligibility, namely 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 102. In addition to the subject matter requirements 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, claims are not patent eligible if they are not novel under 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
Typically, the novelty of a claim should be examined under 35 U.S.C. § 102, where the court looks to 
whether “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on 
sale, or otherwise available to the public.” However, as was established in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and 
affirmed in Myriad Genetics, something classified as a product of nature is not patent eligible under 35 
U.S.C. § 101, regardless of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 81 See id. at 2111 (“We also address the patent eligibility of synthetically created DNA known as 
complementary DNA (cDNA) . . . cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”) The 
Court also explained that, even if the products of isolating and purifying DNA were not patentable, the 
“innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes” could 
have been patentable as a method patent. Id. at 2119. 
 82 See id. at 2120 (“Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we 
express no opinion about the application of § 101 to such endeavors.”). 
 83 See id. 
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B. Where the Law Stands Legislatively: What is Patentable? 
Legislative actions have also limited patentable subject matter 
categories, particularly through codifying policies in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). For more than twenty years, the 
USPTO “had an internal policy that human beings at any stage of 
development are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 
101.”84 Though the USPTO had long prevented patenting of human beings, 
this policy was only recently codified by the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act Section 33(a) in 2011, which states as follows: “Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or 
encompassing a human organism.”85 
This codification was not meant to alter currently patentable subject 
matter under § 101.86 Instead, “Codifying the Weldon amendment [Section 
33(a)] simply continues to put the weight of the law behind the USPTO 
policy.”87 According to legislative interpretation, this “only affects 
patenting human organisms, human embryos, human fetuses, or human 
beings.”88 It does not have any “bearing on stem cell research or patenting 
genes.”89 
Though the Congressional record does provide some clarity as to the 
legislative purpose of Section 33(a), namely to render subject matter such 
as human embryos and human fetuses unpatentable, it does little to define 
the term “human organism.”90 Human organism must have a different and 
broader definition than “human” because both embryos and fetuses are not 
considered human under current United States law.91 The definitional 
ambiguity certainly does not affect beginning-of-life research projects such 
as in vitro fertilization and stem-cell research because these research areas 
 
 84 157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 85 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011). 
 86 157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Weldon) (citing a letter from 
James Rogan, Undersecretary and Director of the U.S. Patent Office, stating “Given that the scope of 
Representative Weldon’s amendment does not alter the USPTO policy on the non-patentability of 
human life-forms at any stage of development and is fully consistent with our policy, we support its 
enactment.”). 
 87 157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 88 157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (citing a July 22, 
2003 speech in the House of Representatives of Hon. Dave Weldon). 
 89 Id. 
 90 157 CONG. REC. E1177-E1180 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011). 
 91 See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2013) (“‘person’, ‘human being’, ‘child’, and ‘individual’, shall include every 
infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.”). Fetuses 
and embryos have not been born and, therefore, are not included under the present definition of “human 
being.” See below, Section V. 
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had the guidance of USPTO policy under which to pursue patents.92 The 
frustratingly missed clarification lies in the growing field of artificial organ 
creation: where does the boundary between human organism and organ 
system lie? 
III.SETTLED PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AT THE USPTO 
To delve into the gray area of patentability in the biotechnological 
space, it is first important to understand definitively patentable subject 
matter in the USPTO.93 Specifically when looking at subject matter that 
may define a human organism, two fields should be explored: in vitro 
fertilization and techniques regarding organ transplants. Combined, these 
fields present the closest available analog to the creation of a human 
organism in Section 33(a). 
A. Creating a Living Creature Through Fertilized Eggs 
In vitro fertilization is a process wherein egg and sperm are combined 
outside of a body.94 The process was originally developed by Robert G. 
Edwards and Dr. Patrick Steptoe as a procedure to treat human infertility.95 
Edwards has received a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2010 for 
his work.96 This was a major breakthrough in the fertility world, with over 
five million children to date being born because of developments in in vitro 
fertilization.97 Certainly, patent law should—and does—support this type of 
breakthrough in medical technology.98 Still, not everything about in vitro 
fertilization is patentable. 
 
 92 157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 93 Specifically referring to current laws and judicial rulings as of February 1, 2017. 
 94 See generally In Vitro Fertilization (IVF): Overview, MAYO CLINIC, www.mayoclinic.org/tests-
procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/home/ovc-20206838 (last visited Jan. 18, 2017) (providing a beginner’s 
guide to in vitro fertilization); A.H. DeCherney, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: A Brief 
Overview, 59 YALE J. OF BIOL. AND MEDICINE 409 (1986) (providing an advanced overview of in vitro 
fertilization). 
 95 See Martin H. Johnson, Robert Edwards: The Path to IVF, 23 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 23 
(2011). 
 96 2010 Press Release for Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (Oct. 4, 2010) (on file with Nobel 
Media AB). Patrick Steptoe died before he could share in the prize. Walter Sullivan, Dr. Patrick Steptoe 
is Dead at 74; Opened Era of ‘Test Tube’ Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1988. 
 97 See Emma Innes, Five Million Babies Have Now Been Born by IVF – and Half Since 2007, New 
Figures Confirm, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 16, 2013, 6:08 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-
2462640/Five-million-babies-born-IVF--HALF-2007.html. 
 98 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Designing 
Children: Patents and the Market are not Sufficient Regulation, MSU BIOETHICS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://msubioethics.com/2014/11/20/designing-children (explaining that Chakrabarty “recognized that 
patents may incentivize technology that needs regulation.”). 
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The black and white aspects of patentability of in vitro fertilization 
technology primarily lie in the differences between product and method 
claims. To obtain a patent, an inventor must contribute something new to 
society, as an invention is only patentable to whoever “invents or discovers 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof.”99 A process, or method claim, 
regarding in vitro fertilization would be directed to a method of performing 
in vitro fertilization.100 This could include methods of preparing egg and 
sperm to be combined, inserting a fertilized egg into a woman, or preparing 
the uterus to receive a fertilized egg.101 Contrastingly, a product claim with 
regards to in vitro fertilization would be directed to the product of the 
method: namely the growing fetus. 
Patent claims for methods of in vitro fertilization are allowable under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 as patentable subject matter.102 These include patents for 
introducing peripheral blood mononuclear cells before transferring an 
embryo into a patient’s uterus, a temperature controlling method for use in 
in vitro fertilization, and a method of fertilizing germ cells.103 Though these 
may rely on a law of nature—namely, that when an egg and sperm meet, 
the egg can become fertilized and grow into a fetus—the method’s steps 
comprise “significantly more” than that law of nature.104 Scientific 
ingenuity and years of experimentation come into play when patenting a 
method of in vitro fertilization because, without relying on scientific 
techniques that do not readily occur in nature, the woman being implanted 
with the fertilized egg would not become pregnant. 
 
 99 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 100 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,589,402 (issued May 20, 1986) (patenting a method of in vitro 
fertilization). 
 101 See id. (claiming a method of in vitro fertilization inducing ovulation, combining ovum and 
spermatozoa, and transferring the conceptus into the uterus). 
 102 See id. 
 103 See U.S. Patent No. 8,137,967 (issued Mar. 20, 2012) (claiming a method of in vitro 
fertilization of a cell in an ovary called an “oocyte”); U.S. Patent No. 6,694,175 (issued Feb. 17, 2004) 
(claiming a method of monitoring the body temperature of a human embryo during in vitro medical 
care); U.S. Patent App. No. 13/655,257 (filed Oct. 18, 2012) (claiming a method of in vitro fertilization 
for a female patient, including introducing “an effective amount of a composition comprising peripheral 
blood mononuclear cells” into the uterus). 
 104 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014) (explaining that, to determine 
whether claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the court must first identify the judicial 
exception represented in the claim “and then determine ‘whether the balance of the claim adds 
“significantly more.”’ (quoting Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012))). 
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The product of this method, otherwise known as the fetus, is not 
patentable and has never been patentable.105 This seems like a logical result: 
a human should not be able to patent another human. Though there are 
many reasons behind this eventual result, the two main reasons in patent 
law are as follows: 1) the product already exists in nature and 2) it would 
be unethical to allow a human to patent another human, and current United 
States patent policy reflects this unethical result.106 
The first reason that fetuses are not patentable is that the product, the 
fetus, already exists in nature.107 Outside of the subject matter eligibility 
requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a person cannot get a patent on 
something that is not new or novel.108 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, if a product 
or process already exists in nature, it cannot later be patented.109 As 
previously discussed in Section III(A), naturally occurring human genes, 
even those isolated from the human body, are not patentable because they 
are naturally occurring.110 For the same reason, a fetus would not be 
patentable. Even if the fetus in question has a combination of genes that 
would not exist but for the method applied, the method being in vitro 
 
 105 157 Cong. Rec. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (explaining the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office “has not issued patents on claims directed to human 
organisms, including human embryos and fetuses.”). 
 106 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless . . . the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on 
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention”); see 
also DRJ Macer, Patent or Perish? An Ethical Approach to Patenting Human Genes and Proteins, 2 
THE PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 361 (2002) (describing ethical dilemmas with human patenting, including 
incentivizing unethical research, harming human moral order including the environment, Article 4 of 
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, and government price controls). 
 107 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (explaining that “handiwork of nature” 
is not patentable subject matter, but a product with “markedly different characteristics from any found 
in nature” is patentable subject matter). 
 108 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (explaining that a condition for patentability is that the claimed 
invention was not in public use or “otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of 
the claimed invention”) (emphasis added). Though the Court has recognized that “the § 102 novelty 
inquiry” may sometimes overlap the “§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry,” this paper is directed to patent 
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1304 (2012). For a more in-depth analysis of the Court’s conflation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 102, see 
Teige P. Sheehan, Mayo v. Prometheus: The Overlap Between Patent Eligibility and Patentability, 21 
BRIGHT IDEAS: N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 1 (Fall 2012). 
 109 See id.; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189-190 (1981) (explaining that 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102 “covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty,” and it could be “an amplification and 
definition of ‘new’ in section 101”); In re Bergstrom 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 110 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has “long held that [35 U.S.C. § 101] contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable” (quoting Association for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013))). 
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fertilization, the result of that method cannot be patented in the wake of 
Prometheus and Myriad Genetics.111 
Additional support for not allowing products of in vitro fertilization to 
be patented can be found in In re Roslin Institute.112 In this case, the Federal 
Circuit determined that cloned animals were unpatentable subject matter.113 
Though genetically modified animals can be patented under United States 
patent law, a clone of an animal cannot be patented.114 As acknowledged in 
In re Roslin Institute, “naturally occurring organisms are not patentable.”115 
Though there are methods relating to selecting materials to be combined 
which will eventually form a living being, “the natural organism itself [is] 
unpatentable because its ‘qualities are the work of nature’ unaltered by the 
hand of man.”116 
A fetus, likewise, is a product “unaltered by the hand of man.”117 
Because the fertilized egg has not been modified, with the exception of a 
natural fertilization process, the product of that fertilization is no different 
than any other fetus or human existing in society.118 The discovery does not 
possess “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”119 
Therefore, the subject matter is unpatentable. 
The second reason that a fetus is unpatentable is spelled out in United 
States policy and law. Specifically Section 33(a) and, before that, general 
USPTO policy did not allow for the patentability of human embryos or 
fetuses.120 Though the definition of human organism is not specifically laid 
out in United States law, it is safe to say that fetuses and humans certainly 
 
 111 Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2120; Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 112 In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 113 See id. at 1339 (stating that “a time-delayed version of a donor mammal,” otherwise known as a 
clone, simply has a “time-delayed characteristic” of the donor mammal, rather than a different 
characteristic of the mammal. Therefore, the clones “are unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”). 
 114 Id. at 1336 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130). 
 117 Id. 
 118 But see Section V (discussing genetic modification and artificial tissues). The above scenario 
assumes that the in vitro fertilization did not also include genetically modifying the spermatozoan 
(sperm), ovum (egg), or zygote (fertilized egg). 
 119 Id. (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310). 
 120 157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (stating that the 
Section 33(a) amendment “provides congressional support for the current U.S. Patent and Trademark 
policy against patenting human organisms, including human embryos and fetuses.”). 
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fall within the category.121 Therefore, the patent office has always had a 
policy to categorically deny patents directed to human fetuses or humans.122 
B. Medical Techniques in Organ Transplants 
Though the American Medical Association “vigorously condemn[s] 
the patenting of medical and surgical procedures,” their campaign to amend 
35 U.S.C. § 101 over the past two decades has been largely unsuccessful.123 
Unlike other countries, the United States allows for inventors to patent 
medical methodologies and surgical procedures.124 However, patents of 
medical methodologies and surgical procedures are not as valuable as other 
method patents.125 35 U.S.C. § 287 limits remedies available to patent 
owners of surgical procedure patents.126 35 U.S.C. § 287 reads, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
 
 121 See id.; see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2105 (2015). 
 122 See id.; 157 CONG. REC. E1180 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (Explaining 
that the Weldon Amendment “should not be construed to affect claims directed to or encompassing 
subject matter other than human organisms, including but not limited to claims directed to or 
encompassing the following: cells, tissues, organs, or other bodily components that are not themselves 
human organisms (including, but not limited to, stem cells, stem cell lines, genes, and living or 
synthetic organs); hormones, proteins or other substances produced by human organisms; methods for 
creating, modifying, or treating human organisms, including but not limited to methods for creating 
human embryos through in vitro fertilization, somatic cell nuclear transfer, or parthenogensis; drugs or 
devices (including prosthetic devices) which may be used in or on human organisms.” The Weldon 
amendment should be construed as Congressional approval “for the long-standing USPTO policy of 
refusing to grant any patent containing a claim that encompasses any member of the species homo 
sapiens at any stage of development” (quoting James Rogan (Nov. 20, 2003) (emphasis added))). 
 123 See Robert Gunderman & John Hammond, The Limited Monopoly: “Under the Knife”—
Patenting Surgical Procedures, 10 ROCHESTER ENGINEER 1 (Feb. 2009) (citing American Medical 
Association, Resolutions, PROC. AM. MED. ASS’N ANNUAL MEETING 390 (1994), www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-history/ama-historical-archives/the-digital-collection-historical-ama-
documents.page). 
 124 See, e.g., Ex Parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107, 110 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954) (overruling the 
examiner’s decision that a medical method claim of injecting fluid into the human body is not 
patentable because “the only useful result . . . is dependent on the reaction of the human body to the 
injected fluid.” The court stated that the “utility of the injection of medicaments as a mode of 
administering medicaments cannot be denied. Consequently, the method . . . must be considered as 
useful within the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 101.”); U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (issued Jan. 14, 1992) 
(patenting a method of making a surgical incision). 
 125 See David B. Gornish, Medical Method Patents, LAW 360 (Sept. 7, 2006, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/9766/medical-method-patents [https://perma.cc/H2CF-G8UQ] 
(explaining that useful processes and methods can be patentable. Though “the United States is one of 
the only countries which considers medical methods to be patentable subject matter,” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 287(c) limits medical method patents. § 287(c) “exempts licensed medical professionals (e.g. doctors) 
and related healthcare entities (e.g. hospitals) from liability for infringement of medical method 
patents.”). 
 126 See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011) (explaining that if a medical practitioner infringes a patent, the 
patent owner cannot collect an infringement remedy from the medical practitioner or the health care 
entity, such as a hospital, with respect to the medical activity performed by the medical practitioner); 
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(c) With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity 
that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the provisions of 
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against the medical 
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical 
activity . . . (c)(3) This subsection does not apply to the activities of any 
person, or employee or agent of such a person . . . who is engaged in the 
commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy 
or clinical laboratory services . . . where such activities are: (A) directly 
related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or 
distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the 
provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services. . . .127 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 287, a patentee cannot collect infringement 
remedies, including civil trial, injunction, damages, and attorney’s fees, as 
a result of a medical practitioner “infringing” the patented medical 
activity.128 In other words, if a doctor performs the patented procedure, the 
patent owner cannot sue for damages. 
However, this does not revoke the patentability of the medical 
procedures under 35 U.S.C. § 101.129 Though a patent owner of a medical 
procedure patent certainly cannot collect damages from a medical 
professional, the owner can collect damages in an industrial setting.130 In 
business, research “that is in keeping with the alleged infringer’s legitimate 
business, regardless of commercial implications,” is susceptible to patent 
 
see also Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 299, 306-310 (Winter 2008) (providing a legislative history summary of 35 U.S.C. § 287). 
 127 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) (direct infringement); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b) (2010) (infringement by active inducement); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952) (remedy for infringement 
of a patent); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952) (injunction); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (damages); 35 U.S.C. § 285 
(1952) (attorney fees). This only exempts 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and (b), meaning that a patent owner can 
collect from medical practitioners or heath care providers under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) for matters related 
to contributory infringement. 
 128 See id.; see also Gornish, supra note 125 (explaining that a surgeon who performs an infringing 
surgery “would be insulated from infringement liability under § 287(c).” Patented medical methods 
where “the only persons or entities that are likely to directly infringe a patented medical method cannot 
be held liable for infringement . . . [are] essentially worthless.”). 
 129 See Gornish, supra note 125 (“[T]here are two phases of the patent process: (1) procurement 
and (2) enforcement. Procurement (i.e., patent prosecution) involves applying for and obtaining a patent 
from the government. Enforcement is how the patent holder uses an issued patent to exclude others 
from practicing the patented invention, and/or obtain damages for infringement.” 35 U.S.C. § 287 limits 
enforcement, not procurement, of a patent.). 
 130 See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011) (protecting only “a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical 
activity” and not a person “engaged in the “commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or 
distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . where such activities are . . . 
directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory 
services.”). 
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infringement suit.131 Therefore, if infringing medical procedures are used in 
business rather than in medical practice, the patent owner could sue the 
infringer for damages. 
The exploration of and monetary incentives behind organ transplant 
extend far beyond medical procedures. Though the field of organ transplant 
originated with medical procedures, the field has now become intertwined 
with artificial tissue development.132 As discussed in more detail below, 
artificial tissues can be used as replacements for natural tissues.133 As a 
replacement, artificial tissues could be transplanted into a human as a 
substitute for an organ or tissue donation.134 However, because these 
tissues, unlike natural tissues, could be commoditized and produced in 
industry, industrial facilities would be practicing the methods of 
transplanting tissues. Therefore, methodologies related to organ transplant 
not only remain patentable under United States law, but are also rapidly 
becoming valuable patents. 
IV.UNSETTLED PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER: THE GREY LINE OF 
ARTIFICIAL HUMAN ORGANISMS 
This section looks to dissect the struggle of differentiating between 
artificial creation of a human organism and progressive scientific 
experimentation in creating human tissues. As the creation of artificial 
human organs bridges the gap between science fiction and fact, scientists, 
legislators, and ethicists are working to simultaneously incentivize 
scientific progress and discourage unethical experimentation. Their 
intentions can be united through defining the term “human organism” in 
Section 33(a) to effectively discourage unethical experimentation. 
A. A Scientist’s Perspective: Defining the “Progress of Science” Through 
Researchers and Ethicists 
To better define the difference between ethical experimentation and 
monstrous unethical research, look to the scientists. The consequences of 
incentivizing the creation of an artificial human are recognized far outside 
of the legal space. The scientific community as a whole regularly works to 
 
 131 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 132 See Tissue Engineering, 18 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY IT56, IT56-IT58 (2000) (discussing the 
history and future of the tissue engineering industry). 
 133 See, e.g., Alessandro Gonfiotti, et al., The first tissue-engineered airway transplantation: 5-year 
follow-up results, 383 THE LANCET 238, 238–44 (2014) (discussing the progress of the tissue-
engineered, artificially created trachea after the first transplantation in 2009). 
 134 See id. (showing that the trachea could be grown in a laboratory and inserted into a person. This 
process is in lieu of using the tissue or organs of an organ donor). 
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de-incentivize pursuits that are ethically questionable at best. Unethical and 
socially unacceptable scientific studies regarding human experimentation 
are often heavily criticized before publication, may be denied publication 
from top journals, and may lose grant funding.135 Though, like patents, this 
cannot stop a scientist from finding his or her own funding and engaging in 
privatized experiments, removing incentives reduces the impact of those 
studies before science and the law have come to a consensus concerning 
procedure after such a study is successful.136 Patent law should work in 
parallel with ethicists and scientists to collectively incentivize innovation 
while discouraging unethical artificial human experimentation. 
Research scientists often rely on government grants, private grants, 
and funding from foundations to fund their research.137 With federal grants 
dwindling with recent budgetary cuts, the competition to receive grants has 
only become stiffer.138 The culture of the academic scientific world is based 
on a “publish or perish” philosophy.139 The amount of publications and, 
more importantly, the prestige these publications afford the scientists, 
correlates both to the amount of funding the scientist’s laboratory may 
receive and the career success of that scientist.140 
Like legal or medical journals, scientific journals have a known 
ranking system. Journals that have a high-impact, meaning that the articles 
published in those journals are cited more frequently in a three year time 
 
 135 See Karen Young Kreeger, Reproduction Research Held Back by Diffuse Rules, Charged 
Politics THE SCIENTIST (1997), available at http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo
/18343/title/Reproduction-Research-Held-Back-By-Diffuse-Rules--Charged-Politics/ [https://perma.cc
/86BP-QGYM] (explaining that Mark Hughes, a professor at Georgetown University, “used agency 
funds, in part, to conduct genetic tests on DNA derived from human embryos destined for in vitro 
fertilization” and, as a result, lost his funding). 
 136 See id. 
 137 See Paula E. Stephan, The Economics of Science, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1199, 1225 (Sept. 1996) 
(“U.S. Scientists are responsible for raising their own funds through the submissions of proposals to 
funding agencies.”). 
 138 See Art Jahnke, Who Picks Up the Tab for Science?, BOSTON U. (2015) http://www.bu.edu
/research/articles/funding-for-scientific-research/ [https://perma.cc/HWY2-ANHX] (“[s]ince the 2010 
apex, cuts to discretionary spending have clipped R&D funds by 15.4 percent in inflation-adjusted 
spending”); Bob Grant, Follow the Funding, THE SCIENTIST (May 2015), http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/42799/title/Follow-the-Funding/ [https://perma.cc/8V7N-E4WU] 
(showing that laboratories unable to fund salaries and experiments with dwindling National Institutes of 
Health funding). 
 139 See Danielle Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical Support 
from US States Data, PLOS (2010), http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010271 [https://perma.cc
/WEG5-T768] (explaining that “The growing competition and ‘publish or perish’ culture in academia 
might conflict with the objectivity and integrity of research, because it forces scientists to produce 
‘publishable’ results at all costs.”). 
 140 See id. (explaining “bibliometric parameters to evaluate careers (e.g. number of publications 
and the impact factor of the journals they appeared in)” are integral to a scientist’s career in academia). 
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period, are considered more prestigious.141 For example, Nature Reviews 
Molecular Cell Biology has an impact factor of 32.928 for 2015, meaning 
that each article published since 2012 in the journal was cited, on average, 
32.928 times at the end of the 2015 year.142 Comparatively, a lower-impact 
journal, such as Trends in Biochemical Sciences had an impact factor of 
10.183 in 2015.143 
The higher the impact of a paper often correlates with the prestige of 
the study.144 This, however, often leads to a cyclical turn of events. The 
more attention a paper gains in the scientific world, the better.145 Therefore, 
scientists want to publish in a journal that has a high impact factor, because 
that increases the likelihood of a particular paper being a high impact 
paper. In turn, more scientists read and reference studies in high impact 
journals because they are considered more prestigious.146 Though many 
have published articles explaining that the impact factor of a journal may 
not be the most accurate way to measure the value or import of the article, 
the impact factor is nevertheless one of the most emphasized components 
when choosing a publication journal.147 
To discourage unethical scientific experiments and, thus, both 
decrease the likelihood of independent funding for experiments and the 
readership for results of unethical experiments, high impact journals will 
refuse to publish unethical scientific pursuits regardless of overall scientific 
value.148 Journal editors recognize that article selection encourages 
 
 141 See id. (showing that the impact factor is an important aspect when evaluating the prestige of a 
publication). 
 142 Scimago Journal & Country Rank, SCIMAGO LAB (2016), http://www.scimagojr.com
/journalrank.php?category=1312 [https://perma.cc/5R45-HHDX]. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Kamil Mizera, The Big IF: Is Journal Impact Factor Really So Important?, OPEN SCIENCE 
(June 7, 2013) (“Despite many negative voices and evidence, the impact factor is still doing well and is 
one of the most influential criteria when establishing the prestige and career of a scientist.”). 
 145 See id. (showing that paper authors care about having the most citations from their respective 
publications and, therefore, are still publishing at high impact factor journals). 
 146 See id. (showing that despite Open Access publications having a wide audience, scholars 
“usually prefer to publish (or try to publish) in the traditional way, in journals with Impact Factors.”). 
 147 Id. 
 148 David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos, 
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modify-
human-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/7NJM-DZA4] (showing that the high impact journals, 
Nature and Science refused to publish a paper about modifying human embryos. Though the research 
may have been properly vetted, the ethical concerns associated with experimenting on the human 
embryo became an overwhelming factor in denying the lead scientists a publication.” Huang says that 
the paper [about modifying human embryos] was rejected by Nature and Science, in part because of 
ethical objections.”). 
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scientists to pursue further paths of research related to a publication.149 
Without high impact publications, progress will become slower and, 
perhaps, the field of inquiry will die altogether. With regards to the 
development of an artificial human, high impact journals such as Science, 
Cell, and Nature are refusing to publish certain experimental results, 
demonstrating that the scientific community recognizes that questionably-
ethical experiments regarding the creation of artificial humans are no 
longer simply science fiction.150 By rejecting articles for publication 
regarding gene-editing and head transplantation, as discussed below, 
scientists are showing that there are limits to what should be encouraged 
for the purposes of the “Progress of Science.”151 
Recently, scientists have discovered a breakthrough system for gene 
editing known as “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic 
repeats” or “CRISPR” for short.152 Gene editing techniques can be used for 
everything from medicine to crop seed enhancement to germline editing.153 
Overall, the CRISPR-Cas9 system enables scientists to remove, add, or 
alter sections of a DNA sequence faster, cheaper, and more accurately than 
previous DNA editing techniques.154 Changing a section of DNA allows 
scientists to study the function of that section of DNA, which can be useful 
for learning about almost anything involving how a cell works, whether 
that be a plant cell, animal cell, bacterial cell, or fungal cell.155 However, 
with almost every scientific discovery regarding life, it is possible for 
research to take a dangerous and unethical turn. 
 
 149 See id.; see also Daniel Cressey & David Cyranoski, Human-embryo Editing Poses Challenges 
for Journals, NATURE NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), www.nature.com/news/human-embryo-editing-poses-
challenges-for-journals-1.17429 [https://perma.cc/N4BJ-ME4H] (explaining that there are “complex 
ethical concerns and potential societal impacts” associated with studies on the human germline (quoting 
Emilie Marcus, editor-in-chief of Cell)). 
 150 See Cressy, supra note 149 (explaining that gene-editing of human embryos is complicated and 
that journals, such as Cell, require “high technical and ethical standards” to publish); see also Journal 
Info, (2016) www.bioxbio.com/if/html/NATURE.html [https://perma.cc/PZ66-L3A9] (Nature 2015 
impact factor: 38.138; Science 2015 impact factor: 34.661; Cell 2015 impact factor: 28.710). 
 151 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 152 See, e.g., What is CRISPR-Cas9?, GENOME CAMPUS (Dec. 19, 2016), www.yourgenome.org
/facts/what-is-crispr-cas9 (providing a beginner’s guide to CRISPR); Alex Reis, et al., CRISPR/Cas9 
and Targeted Genome Editing: A New Era in Molecular Biology, 1 NEB EXPRESSIONS (2014), 
https://www.neb.com/tools-and-resources/feature-articles/crispr-cas9-and-targeted-genome-editing-a-
new-era-in-molecular-biology [https://perma.cc/4U9V-LG3G] (providing a more advanced guide to 
CRISPR). 
 153 See id. 
 154 See id. 
 155 See What is CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 152 (looking at the applications and implications of 
CRISPR-Cas9). 
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Though the CRISPR-Cas9 system is useful in many contexts, the use 
of the system to edit human reproductive (germline) cells has become a 
cause for concern in the scientific community.156 Scientists have been using 
CRISPR-Cas9 to edit non-reproductive (somatic) cells for over a decade.157 
However, the ability to edit human germline cells, otherwise known as egg 
and sperm cells, grants scientists the ability to essentially create genetically 
modified humans.158 
Germline modifications are different than somatic modifications 
because germline modifications are heritable.159 This means that, if the 
germline modification results in a viable human that can reproduce, that 
human can pass on the germline modification to offspring.160 As of now, 
scientists cannot predict what effect this will have on future generations.161 
Encouraging research on germline modification could result in “unsafe or 
unethical uses of the technique,” including changing skin color, 
intelligence, or athletic ability.162 
The scientific outcry with regards for discouraging human germline 
editing occurs on two main levels, the individual level and the community 
level. Many scientists have called for a voluntary moratorium to 
“discourage human germline modification and raise public awareness of 
the difference between [genome editing in somatic cells and in germ 
cells].”163 Essentially, each scientist would voluntarily stop researching 
CRISPR-Cas9 applications on germline cells.164 Though this may work on a 
small-scale basis, individual moratoriums are not going to stop scientific 
 
 156 See Edward Lanphier, et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, NATURE (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nature.com/news/don-t-edit-the-human-germ-line-1.17111 [https://perma.cc/SXQ6-PUBE]. 
 157 See Rodolphe Barrangou, CRISPR Provides Acquired Resistance Against Viruses in 
Prokaryotes, 315 SCIENCE 1709 (2007). 
 158 See Lanphier, supra note 156. 
 159 See David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos, 
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modify-
human-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/7NJM-DZA4]. 
 160 See id. (noting concerns about “inheritable genetic modifcation[s].”). 
 161 See id. (explaining that “genome editing in human embryos using current technologies could 
have unpredictable effects on future generations.”). 
 162 See id. (“Researchers have also expressed concerns that any gene-editing research on human 
embryos could be a slippery slope towards unsafe or unethical uses of the technique.”). Though the idea 
with editing germ cells is to reduce risk of cancer or handicaps, this could lead to people who are less 
accepting of people with disabilities in society. Creating these “designer babies” could create a rift 
between those able to afford CRISPR modification and those who cannot. Furthermore, eliminating 
strands of DNA we know may cause cancer may have untold consequences when a person reproduces. 
There is no way for certain to verify that these untold consequences will not come to light without 
human reproduction. 
 163 See Lanphier, supra note 156. 
 164 See id. 
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research on a large scale. The lure of a high impact human germline editing 
paper would be enough for some scientists to override this voluntary 
cessation of research.165 Thus, the journal editors and funding agencies must 
also disincentivize human germline modification for this to have a large 
impact. 
In 2015, Chinese researchers led by Junjiu Huang edited the genome 
of human embryos.166 Huang recognized the potential ethical concerns with 
his research and used “non-viable embryos . . . obtained from fertility 
clinics” to modify a human gene.167 Though the embryos could not produce 
a live birth if implanted into a human through in vitro fertilization, 
scientists and journals worldwide recognized that experiments on human 
embryos—viable or not—is ethically questionable.168 
Nature and Science, two of the highest impact scientific journals in the 
world, rejected the paper and refused to publish the results.169 Huang 
explained that the rejection was based, in part, on ethical objections.170 
Though the results were published in a Beijing-based journal, Protein & 
Cell, a refusal of publication from Nature and Science will dissuade other 
scientists from pursuing research on human embryos regardless of ethical 
concerns.171 Protein & Cell, an online journal with an impact factor of 
3.817 cannot compare in prestige to Nature and Science.172 The perception 
of paper quality in journals with low impact factors is, in turn, lower than 
papers published in high impact journals. As a result of subject matter 
rejection from top science journals, other scientists are dissuaded from 
pursuing or continuing human embryo gene editing studies – at least for the 
time being. 
 
 165 See, e.g., Richard Gray, Surgeon Behind World’s First Human Head Transplant Says the 
Operation Could Take Place in the UK Next Year, DAILYMAIL.COM (Nov. 23, 2016, 12:21PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3949888/Controversial-surgeon-world-s-human-HEAD-
transplant-reveals-virtual-reality-help-prepare-patients.html [https://perma.cc/FF26-UCAQ] (explaining 
that there is a neurosurgeon who will attempt to transplant a human head, but scientists are skeptical, in 
part, because the experiments the neurosurgeon has performed so far are not proven to work for 
humans. The journals cited are not peer-reviewed and are not evidence-based publications). 
 166 See Puping Liang, et al., CRISPR/Cas9-mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear 
Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN CELL 363 (2015). 
 167 David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos, 
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modify-
human-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/T7ZE-YY5M] (modifying a human gene to prevent a 
potentially fatal blood disorder). 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. (“Huang says the paper was rejected by Nature and Science”). 
 170 See id. 
 171 See Liang, supra note 166. 
 172 See Impact Factor of Protein & Cell, BIOXBIO, (2016) www.bioxbio.com/if/html/PROTEIN-
CELL.html [https://perma.cc/7QF9-3Y2J]. 
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Furthermore, funding organizations, including the National Institute of 
Health (NIH) are refusing to fund gene editing studies of human 
embryos.173 Days after Huang’s paper was published in Protein & Cell, the 
NIH released a statement entitled “Statement on NIH funding of research 
using gene-editing technologies in human embryos.”174 Though the NIH 
recognized that gene editing can be used to improve scientific 
“understanding of gene function and advance potential therapeutic 
applications to correct genetic abnormalities,” the NIH will categorically 
refuse funding gene-editing technologies in human embryos.175 The NIH 
explained that altering the human germline has been debated over many 
years and the scientific community has reached an almost universal 
consensus that altering the human germline is “a line that should not be 
crossed.”176 Cited factors included safety issues, ethical issues about 
affecting future generations of humans without their consent, and “lack of 
compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in 
embryos.”177 Without funding from the NIH, many laboratories will simply 
lack the ability to perform scientific studies and, thus, will lose yet another 
incentive to experiment on human embryos.178 
The scientific community does not just recognize the need to 
disincentivize an artificial or mutated human by means of embryo 
modifications. In recent years, an Italian neurosurgeon named Dr. Sergio 
Canavero has spoken about performing “the first human head transplant” in 
2017, pending “ethical approval and the funding to do it.”179 However, 
many scientists have argued against pursuing such experiments, explaining 
 
 173 Francis S. Collins, Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-editing Technologies in 
Human Embryos, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/about-
nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-nih-funding-research-using-gene-editing-
technologies-human-embryos [https://perma.cc/JWP5-2NPZ] (“NIH will not fund any use of gene-
editing technologies in human embryos.”). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See id. (“These include the serious and unquantifiable safety issues, ethical issues presented by 
altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without their consent, and a current lack 
of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in embryos.”). 
 178 But see Bob Grant, Follow the Funding, THE SCIENTIST (May 1, 2015), http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/42799/title/Follow-the-Funding/ [https://perma.cc/PKK9-LL5Y] 
(showing that scientists will adapt to fund their laboratories, rather than assume their experiments will 
eventually be funded). 
 179 See Prakash Chandra, Meet Sergio Canavero, the Neurosurgeon Who Will Carry Out First 
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the ethical costs far outweigh the scientific benefits.180 Furthermore, many 
explain that Dr. Canavero’s experiment “has been mostly about publicity 
rather than the production of good science.”181 Papers concerning Dr. 
Canavero’s research are being published in journals which are guest-edited, 
rather than peer-edited.182 Without being published in a peer-reviewed 
journal, meaning a journal where other neuroscientists and researchers 
would examine Canavero’s results, these experiments are merely “science 
through public relations.”183 The lack of peer reviewed journal publications 
casts doubt on the veracity of Dr. Canavero’s results and, potentially, the 
source of future funding of his experiments.184 The ethical outcry by both 
journal publications and by individual scientists seems to be slowing the 
progress on Dr. Canavero’s endeavors.185 
Through the examples of CRISPR human embryo editing and head 
transplantation, the scientific community has demonstrated two facts: 
science is progressing towards artificially creating humans and the 
scientific community is attempting to stop progress of questionably ethical 
human experimentation. By removing incentives of funding and journal 
publication, it has become harder for scientists to progress in experiments 
related to human genetic modification. United States law, and patent law in 
particular, must become more transparent before it can have the same effect 
of deterring experimentation in this space.186 To effectively dissuade 
creation of a human organism, the term “human organism” must become 
better defined under current United States law and in the United States 
patent system. 
 
 180 See, e.g., Anto Cartolovni & Antonio G. Spagnolo, Ethical Considerations Regarding Head 
Transplantation, 6 SURG. NEUROL. INT. 103 (2015) (explaining that the patient “will be exposed to far 
greater and unknown risks than the benefits of the procedure.” These include immunosuppressive drugs, 
genetic inheritance, and using organs that “could be useful to someone else that needs a heart or liver 
that could save his/her life.”). 
 181 See Sam Wong, Head Transplant Carried Out on Monkey, Claims Maverick Surgeon, NEW 
SCIENTIST (Jan. 19, 2016) (quoting Thomas Cochrane, a neurologist at Harvard Medical School’s 
Center for Bioethics), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2073923-head-transplant-carried-out-on-
monkey-claims-maverick-surgeon/ [https://perma.cc/9GJH-H5GD]. 
 182 See id. (explaining that the research has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal). 
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. (as of 2017, Canavero has not been granted funding or approval for the proposed 
experimental surgery). 
 186 The ambiguity of “human organism” in Section 33(a) requires clarification before examiner and 
USPTO rejections can be truly effective against an inventor attempting to patent artificial human 
products. 
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B. Products of Life: The Current Problems with Patenting Artificial 
Tissues 
The divide between necessary scientific research and potentially 
unethical experimentation comes to a crux with artificial copying of human 
organisms. Though the patent system strives to incentivize research, it 
often falls short of fully supporting biotechnology. Due to ambiguous 
language, conflicting legislation, and unclear court opinions, research 
attempting to mimic nature cannot be properly promoted within the current 
confines of the patent system. 
Under the current patent system, scientists can obtain patents for 
artificial tissues, even those comprising human cells.187 These tissues are 
considered patentable for one main reason: the artificial tissues are 
different than naturally occurring tissues.188 Scientists are in the process of 
developing artificial tissues and artificial organs.189 These organs are 
eventually meant to be compatible with human organs.190 That is, natural 
organ donations may eventually become a thing of the past. The object of 
many of these research projects is to create organs for those on organ 
donation waiting lists.191 The problem lies in this progression: scientists are 
working to replicate a natural product. The closer scientists get to 
replication of a natural product, the further scientists get to patent 
protection of their invention. 
 
 187 See, e.g., U.S. Patent App. No. 14/153,535 at 4 (Notice of Allowance issued Sept. 27, 2016) 
(claiming in Claim 4 “an artificial tissue construct . . . comprising alveolar primary epithelial cells . . . 
wherein the alveolar primary epithelial cells . . . are human cells.”). 
 188 See Yasuhiko Tabata, Biomaterial Technology for Tissue Engineering Applications, 6 J. OF THE 
ROYAL SOCIETY INTERFACE S311, S314 (2009) (comparing natural and synthetic biomaterials used in 
tissue engineering-based regeneration therapy); Yalda A.Kharaz, et al., Proteomic Differences Between 
Native and Tissue-engineered Tendon and Ligament, 16 PROTEOMICS 1547, 1550-1552 (Apr. 8, 2016) 
(discussing the differences between engineered and natural tissues). 
 189 See, e.g., Anthony Atala, Tissue Engineering of Artificial Organs, 14 J. OF ENDOUROLOGY 49, 
49-51 (2009) (discussing tissue engineering efforts for tissue and organs within the urinary system); see 
also U.S. Patent No. 5,750,329 (issued May 12, 1998) (patenting methods and compositions for an 
artificial lung organ culture system). 
 190 See id. (“Trials of urethral tissue replacement with processed collagen matrices are in progress, 
and bladder replacement using tissue engineering techniques are currently being arranged. Recent 
progress suggests that engineered urologic tissues may have clinical applicability in the future.”); see 
also Alexandra Ossola, Scientists Grow Full-sized, Beating Human Hearts from Stem Cells POPULAR 
SCIENCE (Mar. 16, 2016) http://www.popsci.com/scientists-grow-transplantable-hearts-with-stem-cells 
(showing that growing artificial organs will combat organ shortage problems). 
 191 See The Surprising Future of Artificial Organ Transplants, Brandvoice, FORBES (Sept. 26, 
2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oppenheimerfunds/2016/09/26/the-surprising-future-of-
artificial-organ-transplants/#af9323f43963 [https://perma.cc/BGA4-YNSW] (providing an overview of 
artificial organ research done thus far and explaining that “[s]cientists are finding newer, cheaper and 
safer pathways to create artificial organs — pathways that could reduce the wait for organ transplants 
and transform surgery as we know it.”). 
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As explained above, according to 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 102, if a 
product or process already exists in nature, it cannot later be patented.192 If 
scientists are able to create exact replicas of organs or human tissues, their 
inventions are not patentable under current law.193 The process to create the 
artificial tissue could be patentable, but the actual product may not be. The 
more similar the artificial organ is to a real organ, the less likely the 
invention would be patentable.194 The distinction between patentable and 
not patentable artificial tissue replication becomes murkier every day. With 
the addition of Section 33(a), the USPTO can impose additional hurdles to 
biotechnology inventors.195 
Currently, the USPTO has not rejected many current patents based on 
Section 33(a).196 However, the file history of US 8,821,541 shows that 
Section 33(a)—not § 102—can be used to prevent the patentability of 
tissues.197 In the file history of ‘541, the inventor patented an apparatus for 
anchoring a surgical suture to a bone.198 During the examination of the 
 
 192 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015). 
 193 See id. (showing that, if something already exists in nature before an inventor applies for a 
patent, the material is not patentable; see also Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 194 See Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2118 (showing that isolated and purified DNA is not 
patent-eligible, even with laboratory intervention). 
 195 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011) (reading 
in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no patent may issue on a claim 
directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Without properly defining the term “human 
organism,” but showing that this is a necessary amendment to patent laws and, specifically 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 laws, the difference between “human organism” and a “product of nature” is unclear and can be 
an additional barrier to patent applicants outside of typical § 101 law.). 
 196 This was first searched through “Harvard Dataverse,” providing a compilation of all rejections 
of patent applications until December 11, 2015. See Michael Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, Replication 
Data For: Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid 
Patents? Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, HARVARD DATAVERSE (2015), 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/ABE7VS [https://perma.cc
/D2RB-VAEQ]. After searching 200 randomized rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and finding nothing, 
this was then searched through docketalarm.com, a search database, to determine if any post-grant 
proceedings, including litigations, inter partes reviews, and post-grant reviews, were conducted on 
patents rejected under Section 33(a). DOCKET ALARM, www.docketalarm.com (last visited Jan. 25, 
2017). Out of the 77 search results, three post-grant proceedings were conducted on patents rejected 
under Section 33(a). These are summarized as follows: US Patent App. No. 13/672,422 (filed Nov. 8, 
2012) (Aug. 17, 2016 Final Rejection rejecting claims reciting the “neck of a user” under Section 33(a) 
and suggesting an amendment reciting the term “adapted to the neck of a user” to ameliorate the 
rejection); U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 (issued Sept. 2, 2014) (discussed below, notes 197-200); U.S. 
Patent No. 7,454,002 (reissue U.S. App. No. 14/567,016 (filed Dec. 11, 2014)) (Apr. 12, 2016 Non-
Final Rejection rejecting claim 30 reciting that a receiver “is coupled to the user” and, therefore, 
positively claims the user). Only the U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 rejection remotely discusses patenting a 
human organism. All other rejections amount to little more than draftsman errors. 
 197 U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 (issued Sept. 2, 2014). 
 198 See id. (patenting a “suture anchor with insert-molded rigid member”). 
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application, the examiner rejected claim 34, which recited a suture anchor 
“wherein at least one suture strand has a length sufficient to tie tissue.”199 
The examiner stated “Claim 34 is positively claiming the tissue which is a 
human organism” and, thus it is “excluded from the scope of patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”200 Regardless of the validity of the 
examiner’s rejection, the statement that tissue is a human organism 
demonstrates that Section 33(a) requires clarity.201 By allowing an examiner 
to reject a claim to a tissue as a “human organism,” the uncertainty behind 
the business of artificial organ creation grows larger. 
Herein lies the problem with artificial tissue creation and, eventually, 
artificial organ and organ system creation. If patent law were used to 
incentivize creation of an artificial organ, the law should render the 
artificial product patentable and not just the process of creating the organ. 
However, patent law does not incentivize creating exact replicas of DNA or 
animals that already exist in nature.202 If the object of creating an artificial 
organ is to replicate one already found in nature, then, as science gets 
closer and closer to the ultimate object, the products become less and less 
likely to be patentable subject matter.203 Even if the product would be 
different than what currently exists in nature, the definition of Section 33(a) 
with regards to a human organism is so broad that, ultimately, no bio-
manufactured organ could be patentable.204 
 
 199 See Non-final Rejection of Application No. 11/518,872, 9 (non-final rejection issued Feb. 21, 
2014) (Application of U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 (issued Sept. 2, 2014)) (it should be noted that this 
rejection was most likely directed to claim 33, not claim 34), as is evident from the patent file history). 
 200 See id. (showing that 33(a) is considered in the USPTO to be a subset of 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 201 See id.; see also 157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Weldon) 
(citing a letter from James Rogan, Undersecretary and Director of the U.S. Patent Office, stating “Given 
that the scope of Representative Weldon’s amendment [Section 33(a)] does not alter the USPTO policy 
on the non-patentability of human life-forms at any stage of development and is fully consistent with 
our policy, we support its enactment.”). If Section 33(a) was not meant to alter USPTO policy, then the 
claims should have been otherwise allowable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because tissues, even those 
comprising human cells are considered patentable. See, e.g., U.S. Patent App. No. 14/153,535 (Notice 
of Allowance issued Sept. 27, 2016) (claiming in Claim 4 “an artificial tissue construct . . . comprising 
alveolar primary epithelial cells . . . wherein the alveolar primary epithelial cells . . . are human cells.”). 
 202 See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1351 
(2012) (explaining that “[T]here is no magic to a chemical bond that requires us to recognize a new 
product when a chemical bond is created or broken.” This shows that, even if DNA or a tissue is created 
synthetically in a laboratory, if it matches what already exists in nature, the synthetically created 
biologic material is not patentable.). 
 203 See id. (showing that, the closer scientists get to replicating naturally occurring DNA, the harder 
it would be to patent the product). 
 204 See Amanda H. Russo, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. and Its 
Impact on the Patentability of “Designer” Genes, 4 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 37, 40 (2014) 
(“Unfortunately, the AIA never expressly defines any of the terms in [33(a)] so it is not entirely clear 
what specific subject matter would fall under the prohibition.”); Andrew Armstrong, 3D Printed Human 
Organs and the Debate on Applicable Patent Law, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 7, 2015), 
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C. Defining a “Human Organism”: An Exploration of the Term “Human” 
in Other Areas of United States Law 
To provide clarity to Section 33(a) and promote ethical 
experimentation, there must be a clear, precise definition of “human 
organism” that encompasses the legislative intent behind Section 33(a). To 
produce such a definition, Congress can look to other areas of United States 
law for template definitions of a human. Certainly, the Congressional 
record behind the adoption of Section 33(a) unambiguously demonstrates 
that the term “human organism” has a different meaning in patent law than 
in other legal areas.205 Congressmen claim that human embryos fall under 
the patent definition of “human organism.”206 However, under current 
criminal law statutes, dropping a petri dish full of artificially inseminated 
cells does not constitute murder of a human being. Nevertheless, because 
patent law does not give a clear definition of “human organism,” other 
areas of the law should be used for context and insight. Through looking to 
laws concerning in vitro fertilization and brain-dead individuals, the 
definition of “human organism” in patent law can be designed to 
incentivize artificial organ development and discourage human 
experimentation. Two main statutes can be used for guidance: 1 U.S.C. § 8 
(defining a living human) and the Uniform Death Determination Act 
(defining when a body ceases to be a living human).207 
1 U.S.C. § 8 defines a “person” and “human being” as including 
“every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any 
stage of development.”208 It clarifies that “born alive . . . means the 
complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother of that member, at 
any stage of development, who after such expulsion or extraction breathes 
 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/10/07/3d-printed-human-organs-and-the-debate-on-applicable-patent
-law/id=62307/ [https://perma.cc/S5B6-BMZT] (explaining that using a definition for human organism, 
“any living entity containing one or more cells belonging to the species homo sapiens” would render a 
“bioprinted organ ineligible for patenting.”); see also 157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) 
(statement of Rep. Smith) (“The term ‘human organism’ includes an organism of the human species 
that incorporates one or more genes taken from a nonhuman organism . . . However, it does not include 
non-human organism incorporating one or more genes taken from a human organism.”). 
 205 See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (defining “person” and “human being”); see also Cruzan by 
Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990) (defining occurrence of human 
death); Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf [https://perma.cc/7984-32PD]. 
 206 157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (stating that a 
human embryo is an “organism.”). 
 207 See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002); Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf. The Uniform 
Determination of Death Act has been adopted by 41 states thus far. See, e.g. Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 63, 
§ 3122 (West). 
 208 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002). 
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or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite 
movement of voluntary muscles. . . .”209 This limits a human being to 1) a 
homo sapien 2) who is born and 3) (who is born) alive. 
In terms of end-of-life care in the United States, the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act explains “An individual who has sustained 
either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or 
(2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the 
brain stem, is dead.”210 In other words, if brain function stops, the body is 
no longer alive. Medical professionals are legally allowed to withdraw life 
support without criminal repercussions.211 
The following chart provides a summary of the requirements to be 
considered a human being under 1 U.S.C. § 8 and the requirements to be 
considered dead under the Uniform Determination of Death Act. 
 
1 U.S.C. § 8212 Uniform Determination of Death Act213 
Every infant member of the species 
homo sapien . . . at any stage of 
development 
 
Complete expulsion or extraction 
from his or her mother 
 
Breathes OR has a beating heart, 
Irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory 
functions 
Pulsation of the umbilical cord OR 
definite movement of voluntary 
muscles 
Irreversible cessation of all 
functions of all the entire brain 
Chart 1: Topical Definitions of “Human” or “Living Human” in Other 
Areas of United States Law 
 
Through analyzing the legislative history of Section 33(a), the 
definition of a human being in 1 U.S.C. § 8 cannot simultaneously be used 
 
 209 Id. 
 210 See Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf.; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 2017). 
 211 See Robert M. Sade, Brain Death, Cardiac Death, and the Dead Donor Rule, 107 J.S.C. MED. 
ASS’N 146, 147 (2011) (“Although withdrawal of life support (not the patient’s disease) causes death, it 
is not a legally or morally culpable act.”). 
 212 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002). 
 213 Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf.; Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 63, § 3122 (West 2017). 
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for the term “human organism.” The terms “born” and “alive” were simply 
not contemplated definitional aspects of “human organism” as construed in 
patent law.214 
Because “no member of the human species is an ‘invention’ or 
property to be licensed for financial gain,” Congress intended the term 
“human organism” to encompass human embryos.215 Human embryos are 
not born and are not alive. They have not been expelled or extracted from a 
mother. Furthermore, even if a human embryo was implanted into a uterus 
and developed until just before the embryo formed a fetus, it is not possible 
for the most developed human embryo to be extracted from the uterus 
alive.216 The embryo, as extracted, would not breathe, have a beating heart, 
pulsation of the umbilical cord, or movement of voluntary muscles.217 
Section 33(a) was adopted to “not allow . . . researchers to gain 
financially by granting them an exclusive right to practice . . . ghoulish 
research,” such as creating male-female hybrid embryos.218 Cellular 
research certainly goes beyond what is contemplated as human under 1 
U.S.C. § 8.219 Scientists who are experimenting are not murdering or 
battering embryos. Scientists cannot be prosecuted for murder when 
experimenting with fertilized embryos.220 In fact, scientists can let fertilized 
 
 214 See 157 CONG. REC. E1177 – E1180 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (demonstrating through absence 
that congressmen debating Section 33(a) did not discuss when a human organism was born or when a 
human organism was considered alive). 
 215 See id. at E1177. 
 216 See KEITH L MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, ESSENTIALS OF EMBRYOLOGY AND BIRTH DEFECTS, 6 
(7th ed. 2008) (explaining that at the end of the embryonic period at eight weeks, “the beginnings . . . of 
all essential structures are present.” However, fetuses are not viable until “22 weeks after fertilization, 
but the chance of survival is not good until the fetus is several weeks older.”). 
 217 See id. at 2, 191-194, 245 (explaining that the embryonic period ends at week eight of 
pregnancy; the embryo develops heart tubes and umbilical arteries but not a fully developed heart; 
showing the progression of the musculoskeletal system of the embryo – none of these are functional 
outside of the womb); Pregnancy Timeline, BBC News (Dec. 23, 2004, 13:42 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4121411.stm [https://perma.cc/9F3R-DZYH] (showing a beginner’s 
guide to fetal development and explaining that an embryo is a mass of cells before the second month of 
pregnancy. That embryo develops into a fetus around the second month); M.A. Hill, Respiratory System 
Development, EMBRYOLOGY (Jan. 23, 2017), https://embryology.med.unsw.edu.au/embryology
/index.php/Respiratory_System_Development [https://perma.cc/P7R9-HP96] (explaining that though 
lungs begin to form as an embryo, by the time the embryo develops into a fetus, these lungs are buds, 
“an outgrowth from the ventral wall of the foregut” and are not functional). 
 218 157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 219 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (discussing the definition of a human after birth, but not discussing 
development of a human in utero or by synthetic means). 
 220 But see Ann A. Kiessling, What Is an Embryo?: A Rejoinder, 37 CONN. L. REV. *1, *8 (2004) 
(showing that this issue is contested, arguing “that if embryos have the moral status of persons born, 
then destroying them for any reason is murder” (referencing Harold T. Shapiro, What Is an Embryo?: A 
Comment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2004))). 
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embryos expire without any criminal ramifications.221 The same cannot be 
said for humans. A scientist cannot poke or prod another human with a 
needle, nor can a scientist ignore another human until he or she expires.222 
Therefore, the definition of “human organism” under the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act Section 33(a) must be broader than the definition of 
“person” and “human being” under 1 U.S.C. § 8. 
Nothing grown in a lab will ever be considered “born,” unless 
scientists determine that an artificial uterus is the best way to develop 
cells.223 However, this seems unlikely as it would go against the years of 
progress in cell growth experiments, which currently use scaffolds and 
molds to shape and form artificially grown tissues.224 Therefore, there must 
be a way to distinguish “human organisms” without requiring birth in a 
patent context. The current problem is the uncertainty behind this 
distinction. Looking to end-of-life definitions under United States law 
helps to provide a bit of clarity between the definition of a human and the 
potential definition of a “human organism.” 
The Uniform Determination of Death Act provides a far better 
template to create a working definition of human organism under Section 
33(a). If the definition of death were applied in reverse, meaning that 
nothing became “alive” until it fulfilled the criteria listed under the Act, 
Congress could promote experimentation with artificial organs while still 
preserving the legislative intent to discourage human embryonic 
experiments. This would have the added benefit of avoiding the 
complicated viability arguments entangling abortion.225 
 
 221 Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. CIV. A. 95-5827, 2002 WL 1288784, at *4–5 
(R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002) (explaining that frozen embryos were not considered “‘persons’ for 
constitutional purposes” (quoting Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998))); see also Amber N. 
Dina, Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embryo: Why Illinois is on the Cutting 
Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embryonic Legal Rights, 19 REGENT. U.L. REV. 251, 
264–66 (2006) (discussing the possibility of civil penalties for an embryo bank for wrongfully 
destroying embryos without permission). 
 222 See First Oak Brook Corp. Syndicate v. Comly Holding Corp., 93 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(defining battery as “harmful or offensive contact between or among two or more persons”); see also S. 
John Campanie, 1989 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. (Inf.) 98 (1989) (defining “[a] death caused by unlawful act 
or criminal neglect” as a death that a coroner can investigate). 
 223 See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (defining a human as ‘born alive’ as “the complete expulsion or 
extraction from his or her mother.”). 
 224 See Dietmar W. Hutmacher, Scaffolds in Tissue Engineering Bone and Cartilage, 21 
BIOMATERIALS 2529 (2000) (explaining the use of scaffold designs to artificially design 
musculoskeletal tissue, bone, and cartilage). 
 225 See Yaniv Heled, On Patenting Human Organisms or How the Abortion Wars Feed into the 
Ownership Fallacy, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 241, 256 (2014) (explaining that “the mingling of sex, 
embryo research, and the context of the abortion debate generated sufficient outrage to persuade 
Congress to reenact the Weldon Amendment[Section 33(a)] time and again until it finally found a 
permanent home in Section 33 of the America Invents Act”); see also 157 CONG. REC. E1178–E1181 
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The first requirement of the Uniform Determination of Death Act is 
“irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”226 Applying 
this definition of life, unlike the definition in 1 U.S.C. § 8, to an embryo 
does not specifically require a heart or lungs.227 Though an embryo may 
possess the beginnings of a circulatory and respiratory system, an embryo 
does not have a functional heart or lungs at the end of its development 
process.228 Therefore, a template definition of a “human organism” 
requiring “circulatory and respiratory functions” would unquestionably 
apply to an embryo.229 Additionally, it would exclude artificial organ 
development, except experiments creating a combination of a 
cardiovascular and respiratory system.230 
Furthermore, by the end of the embryonic period and the beginning of 
the fetal development period, “rudimentary structures of the brain and 
central nervous system are established.”231 Therefore, the second prong of 
the Uniform Determination of Death Act could be fulfilled by a human.232 
Artificial tissues do not have a brain or central nervous system.233 Until 
scientists develop an artificial brain, artificial respiratory system, or 
artificial circulatory system that can be implanted into a human, no 
definition of “alive” could overshadow scientific research and deny 
research facilities well-deserved patents. The individual organ systems 
would be patentable under this definition, but the human body receiving the 
 
(daily ed. June 23, 2011) (discussing that embryos are not patentable and showing that viability of an 
embryo does not play into the definition of a “human organism” for patent subject matter purposes). 
 226 See Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf. 
 227 See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (requiring a “person” or “human being” to have a beating heart or 
breathe). 
 228 See Keith L Moore & T.V.N. Persaud, Essentials of Embryology and Birth Defects, 191–94 (7th 
ed. 2008) explaining that the embryonic period ends at week eight of pregnancy; the embryo develops 
heart tubes and umbilical arteries but not a fully developed heart). 
 229 See id. (showing that, though embryos do not have viably formed hearts or lungs, embryos do 
develop circulatory and respiratory functions). 
 230 If scientists artificially developed a working cardiovascular and respiratory system, connected 
these systems, and attached this system to a brain, the overall combination of systems may not be 
patentable subject matter under Section 33(a) if the definition of “human organism” used the template 
of the Uniform Determination of Death Act. This development, however, is far from where science has 
progressed in the present state. 
 231 See Joan Stiles & Terry L. Jernigan, The Basics of Brain Development, 20 NEUROPSYCHOL. 
REV. 327, 328 (2010). 
 232 See Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf (requiring “irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.” If this were to be interpreted broadly, any 
organism with human central nervous system development could be construed to fall under the 
definition of “human organism.”). 
 233 Unless the artificial tissues in question are brain tissues or nervous system tissues. 
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implant would still remain unpatentable, as the combination of functioning 
organ systems would fulfill the definitional basis of a “human organism”. 
Adopting informed definitions of “human organism” from the realm of 
end-of-life care rather than from “beginning of life” definitions would help 
to clarify patentability in biotechnology.234 
The objective of patent law is to incentivize innovation.235 To 
incentivize innovation, particularly in the high-cost world of 
biotechnology, those funding the industry should be able to predict whether 
an eventual product or method, if successful, would become profitable.236 
This profit can be derived from a patent—the ability to exclude others from 
making or using the new product or method.237 With this ability can come 
lucrative licensing deals, which can be used to fund future research and 
development.238 With ambiguity in the law come uncertain investors: would 
investing in artificial organ development be investing in unpatentable 
technology? Through clarifying the term “human organism” by exploring 
both the above definitions of human life and the scientific objectives and 
concerns regarding artificial human development, discussed below, 
artificial tissue development can be investigated while hindering unethical 
experimentation on humans and fetuses. 
V. INCENTIVIZING RESEARCH: DEFINING A “HUMAN ORGANISM” WITH A 
LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC LENS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE TERM “HUMAN” 
IN OTHER AREAS OF UNITED STATES LAW 
This section addresses policy concerns of both scientists and 
legislators in tissue engineering patents. To promote innovation, legislators 
must adopt a clear and strong patent system. This includes allowing 
businesses to obtain patents that will clearly stand in a court of law. To 
clarify the murky subject matter concerns in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Section 
 
 234 At least for the definition of “human organism” as used in Section 33(a) for patentability 
purposes. 
 235 See Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. St.-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 647 F.3d 1373, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“At its heart, the patent system incentivizes improvements to patented 
technology.”). 
 236 See Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“In 
order to best incentivize innovation, however, patent law must be predictable, consistent, and 
uniform.”). 
 237 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law - Balancing Profit Maximization and Public Access 
to Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (explaining that patent rights are “used by 
an enterprise to make a profit.”). 
 238 See, e.g., Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Intel Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 898, 903 (W.D. Wis. 
2009) (explaining that research at the university is supported “by patenting and licensing university 
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33(a) that have emerged in the past decade, scientists and legislators must 
collectively arrive at a consensus to properly define “human organism” to 
promote ethical experimentation in biotechnical organ engineering. 
At a recent international conference discussing the future of life-
patenting, Dr. Calum MacKellar asked whether Dr. Frankenstein should 
have been permitted to patent his creation.239 Congress has answered this 
question with a resounding . . . maybe. As explained during the adoption of 
Section 33(a), “no member of the human species is an invention.”240 Human 
beings are not meant to be “property to be licensed for financial gain.”241 
The object of Section 33(a) was to disincentivize the commodification of 
human life and to not allow “profiteers to financially gain from the biology 
and life of another human person.”242 With the ever-blurring line between 
man and man-made man—from in vitro fertilization to the creation of 
artificial organs—the question of the patentability of Frankenstein’s 
monster has become only more obscure. 
Though the intention behind Section 33(a) was to prevent patenting of 
a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism, there is no law that 
clarified the definition of “directed to” or “human organism.”243 Through 
examining the legislative history behind Section 33(a), two facts become 
abundantly clear: 1) legislators did not want embryos to become patentable 
and 2) legislators did not contemplate the effects Section 33(a) could have 
on human tissue engineering.244 With the increasingly murky judicial 
rulings behind 35 U.S.C. § 101, the lack of clear definitions for Section 
33(a) will slow the development of artificial tissues and artificial organs.245 
 
 239 See Rob Vischer, Patents on Life: The Future of Life-Patenting, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Sept. 5, 
2015), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/09/patents-on-life-the-future-of-life-
patenting.html (referencing the International Conference for Patents on Life: Through the Lenses of 
Law, Religious Faith, and Social Justice, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE (Sept. 4-5, 2015), available at 
http://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/events/past-events/conferences/patents-conference-2015). 
 240 157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 241 Id. 
 242 See id. 
 243 See id. at E1178 (“Even the European Union prevents patents on human embryos.”). 
 244 See id. at E1178-E1181 (discussing that embryos are not patentable, while failing to discuss 
“human organs” or “tissues”). 
 245 See Ryan Davis, Patent Eligibility Confusion Reigns Post-Alice, Experts Say, LAW360 (Mar. 
26, 2015, 7:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/636273/patent-eligibility-confusion-reigns-post-
alice-experts-say [https://perma.cc/73BG-6CTF] (showing that the Court did not clarify patentable 
subject matter under § 101 in the recent case of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)); 
Heidi Ledford, Myriad Ruling Causes Confusion, NATURE NEWS (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.nature.com/news/myriad-ruling-causes-confusion-1.13226 [https://perma.cc/Z6ED-T2HC] 
(showing that the Court also did not clarify patentable subject matter in Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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Though some economists may find that patents do not promote 
innovation in all fields of research, patents do provide clear incentives to 
innovate in the field of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.246 “[T]he 
existence and strength of the patent system affects the organization of 
industry.”247 A working patent system requires clear laws and strong patents 
to function.248 A patent is worth the investment only if it can stand up in 
court.249 With unclear laws regarding the patentability of subject matter 
changing quickly and without direction in the last decade, investments in 
patentable biotechnology could be on the verge of decline.250 
To hedge this possibility, legislators must clarify the law with regard 
to patentable technology. Most specifically, if the law is to truly prevent 
unethical experimentation and simultaneously fulfill the Constitutional 
requirement to “Promote the Progress of Science”, the definition of human 
organism must be clarified.251 No court has issued a ruling construing 
Section 33(a).252 Legislators should develop a further unambiguous record 
before the history of Section 33(a) becomes too convoluted to cleanly 
clarify. 
 
 246 See Bronwyn H. Hall, Patents and Patent Policy, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 568, 576 
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Conclusions: Promoting Biotechnology Innovation in Developing Countries, 22 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY DC48, DC49 (2004) (“In India, the patenting laws have encouraged the country’s 
biotechnologists to invent around existing patents and to come up with processes that reduce production 
costs.”). 
 247 Hall, supra note 246 at 577. 
 248 See id. (“Thus the bottom line from the empirical evidence is that the patent system provides 
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patented technology. 
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Alice v. CLS Bank, JOLT DIGEST (June 28, 2014), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/fate-of-software-
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(showing that the Supreme Court “declined to articulate a definitive test” for the subject matter 
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anxiously awaiting clarification” on the subject); Richard Baker, Where Do We Stand One Year After 
Alice, Law360 (June 17, 2015, 8:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-
one-year-after-alice [https://perma.cc/CM2M-RYA8] (explaining that the “secondary market for 
software and business method patents dried up in the past year as buyers avoid the risks of ineligibility 
under § 101”, “business method patents issued have declined by greater than 60% over similar pre-
Alice periods” ). 
 251 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Now is the time to act. The category of human organism is 
hybridizing. Far from an artificial hip replacement or in vitro fertilization, 
the biotechnological improvements are expanding into what was originally 
considered pure science fantasy: the creation of a human. Experiments in 
implantable tissues and artificial organs are underway.253 Future 
experiments in human tissue transplanting could go beyond life-saving 
procedures, with new procedures being developed to make stronger bones 
and better muscles.254 If these go further than simple organ transplantation, 
stepping into the world of human improvements, the line between human 
organism and human engineered devices will become even vaguer with 
time. 
If the goal of patent law is truly to promote innovation, the patent law 
space must prioritize unambiguous legislative text. In the past decade, 
multiple Court rulings in subject matter patent law have left the scientific 
community wanting.255 In fact, patent law is recognized to be such a 
difficult and tedious matter for judges to decide uniformly that a patent 
pilot program has been established to help judges specialize. Though courts 
may create a definition of “human organism” under 33(a) based on 
legislative history, the job is best left up to the legislature and scientists. 
Promoting science with patents can only go so far without the 
assistance of the science community. The goal to promote science without 
incentivizing unethical experimentation necessitates input from scientists. 
Luckily, commentary with regard to moral issues behind developing an 
artificial human or experimenting on human embryos goes far beyond the 
legal realm. Scientists are trying to prevent unethical experimentation in 
gene-editing and transplant methodologies.256 Their efforts, however, can 
only go so far without legal backing. If patents are enough to incentivize 
scientists to break with moral impositions in their field, then the United 
States patent law will be undermining scientific efforts. 
Science cannot succeed devoid of law. Nor can law be devoid of 
science. For too long, legislative history and judicial precedent have been 
created in the patent world without a true understanding of the implications 
 
 253 See, e.g., Anthony Atala, Tissue Engineering of Artificial Organs, 14 J. OF ENDOUROLOGY 49, 
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 255 See supra note 245. 
 256 See Edward Lanphier, et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, NATURE (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nature.com/news/don-t-edit-the-human-germ-line-1.17111 [https://perma.cc/SU6L-LKYL]. 
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and the science affected by those policies.257 If the goal of defining a 
“human organism” is to dissuade scientists from experimenting on human 
embryos, the true definition of an embryo should be incorporated into the 
law. Instead of shying away from defining before-birth and after-birth 
fetuses and humans due to a complicated moral and theological system, the 
complexities of life should be embraced by the legal and scientific 
communities.258 
Isolating law from science cannot be the policy of the patent system. 
To ameliorate concerns about creating an unclear definition of “human 
organism” under Section 33(a), a committee should form with scientists, 
ethicists, and lawmakers to assess the current state of patent law in 
biotechnology. Together this committee can work toward finding an 
acceptable definition of “human organism” that neither hinders scientific 
exploration nor promotes unethical procedures. 
This definition should use the template provided by the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act, wherein a “human organism” would need to 
have either both circulatory and respiratory functions or functional central 
nervous system.259 If the mutual goal of the scientific and legal 
communities is to discourage experimentation upon fertilization of an egg, 
but encourage experimentation in artificial tissue engineering, the 
definition of a “human organism” cannot be informed by the definition of a 
human being.260 Rather, this definition must be informed by a negative: a 
definition of something possessing human tissue, but not possessing the 
essential qualities of life. The Uniform Determination of Death Act 
provides this very template by explaining when life stops.261 Defining 
“human organism” using the Uniform Determination of Death Act template 
 
 257 See Jeff Guo, The Supreme Court Reveals its Ignorance of Genetics, NEW REPUBLIC (June 13, 
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would encompass human embryos, but would not hinder experimentation 
with regard to artificial tissues and organs.262 
Through providing this clear definition, progress in bioengineering 
can advance unhindered by future ambiguous legislative and judicial 
actions. The definition could clarify the murky laws of patentable subject 
matter for scientists and lawmakers alike. Bringing both certainty and 
transparency to patent law can better inform both scientists and businesses. 
This can help push research toward ethical progress in the field of organ 
transplantation. A committee including both scientists and legislators has 
the most potential to form a cohesive, unambiguous definition of “human 
organism” under Section 33(a). Together, this committee would promote 
scientific progress in biotechnology and prevent the patentability of the 
ultimate ethical concern: Frankenstein’s monster. 
 
 262 See id. 
